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How the U.S. screwed up Diyala

A stunning op-ed by Kiki Munshi, a former provincial reconstruction team (PRT) leader in Diyala province, lays out in detail how the United States wrecked any chance for stability there. Writing in the Post, Munshi describes how he and his team worked with the mayor of Baquba last year, negotiated with former Baathists and assorted other rebels, and valiantly tried to create a working political order in the Shia-Sunni mixed region. But then the Iraqi government appointed a sectarian, death squad-linked general and it all went to hell:

Through the offices of Baqubah Mayor Khalid al-Sanjary, I spoke several times with high-ranking former Baathist military officers who wanted desperately to help their country and to defend it against Iranian incursion. Here our two sides had a common interest: The United States had been tracking the infiltration of war materiel into Diyala from Iran, and much of it was used against us; these Baathists (most of the officers were Sunni) had led Iraqi units during the war against Iran and had no desire to see Iranians control their country. Then came an unfortunate development in the Iraqi forces. The Shiite commanding general was replaced by Maj. Gen. Shaker Hulayel, another Shiite who was said to have been appointed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's office.

Hulayel was sectarian to the core. He talked the talk of peace and reconciliation, but his walk was down corridors lined with Sunni detainees, illegally held and tortured. His walk was in front of death squads, sent to take out important Sunnis. His walk was laced with hatred and contempt for the precepts of democracy and order.

His presence was not helpful to the reconciliation process.

Then the U.S. military decided the murderous Hulayel was an ally:

There was also an unfortunate development in the U.S. military. In the fall, the battalion from the 4th Infantry Division was replaced by a cavalry battalion. Our new colonel was eager to finish the job his predecessor had not. He chose to fight with weapons, not words, as a first option. He dropped the "speak softly" and resorted to the big stick. Out of necessity, as our directions were to work with and train Iraqi forces with a goal of handing responsibility to them, the sectarian Hulayel became an "ally."

The predictable result: the mayor was kidnapped, officials were attacked, the Sunni population driven into violent resistance (and, many of them, into the arms of Al Qaeda types). Now we've switched sides again, helping to arm the Sunnis. As Munshi notes: "The Iraqis have not forgotten. They have lived this chapter before."

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This page contains a single entry from the blog posted on July 7, 2007 10:26 AM.

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