Yet another member of the Coalition of the Willing got unwilling, right on schedule. Slovakia pulled out its 110 army engineers. "The war in Iraq is unbelievably unjust and wrong," said Slovakia's new prime minister, Robert Fico. "To speak about any democracy in Iraq is a fantasy."

For weeks, the Bush administration has been promising to reveal what it knows about Iran's role in the conflict in Iraq, ever since the president's State of the Union address dramatically raised the stakes. The White House has asserted, without evidence, that Iran is providing weapons and other assistance to the people in Iraq killing U.S. troops, even though nearly all of the U.S. casualties in Iraq are caused by military actions by the Sunni-led Iraqi resistance, not the Iranian-allied Shiites (who, after all, are mostly America's allies, too).

Now comes Steve Hadley, the national security adviser and semi-neocon, to announce that the plan to reveal the secrets about Iran is once again being postponed. Why? Because the intelligence was, well, exaggerated. "The truth is, quite frankly, we thought the briefing overstated [Iran's role]," said Hadley. "We sent it back to get it narrowed and focused on the facts." We're waiting.

In 1999, the budget for the Defense Department was $276 billion. For 2008, the Pentagon request will be a staggering $623 billion, including $142 billion for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. (That means defense spending is two and a quarter times higher than it was a decade ago, for those who don't have a calculator handy.)

Thanks to Newsweek, we now know that one of the last of the undead, neocon Eric Edelman, weighed in to skew the Pentagon's inspector-general report on Doug Feith, Edelman's predecessor as undersecretary of defense for policy.

In a blistering internal memo obtained by Newsweek, Eric Edelman, under secretary of defense for policy, characterized portions of the inspector-general's report as “egregious.” Edelman—the Pentagon’s No. 3 official—also staunchly defended the actions of his predecessor, Douglas Feith, who has been criticized for his pre-war efforts to promote the idea that Saddam Hussein's regime had a relationship with Al Qaeda.

The protests of Edelman—and his success in getting acting Pentagon Inspector-General Thomas Gimble to drop recommended policy changes from his report—shows how current and former Cheney aides still wield their clout throughout the government.

Edelman was Scooter Libby's deputy around the time of the invasion of Iraq. I once asked him at a Council on Foreign Relations meeting about whether or not he cooperated with Feith in manipulating intelligence before the war in Iraq, and he flatly denied doing so, though unconvincingly.

According to the Newsweek piece, Edelman wrote a 52-page document denouncing the IG's report, and Thomas Gimble, the IG, capitulated to Edelman by removing sections of his report that called for important policy changes.

It's the lunar new year, and right on schedule John McCain, the Vietnam vet, said that he fears that the Iraqi resistance is planning a Tet, 1968, style offensive:

"By the way, a lot of us are also very concerned about the possibility of a, quote, 'Tet Offensive.' You know, some large-scale tact that could then switch American public opinion the way that the Tet Offensive did," the Arizona senator said.

I wonder what exactly he means by saying that a Tet-style offensive could "switch" American opinion. It's already overwhelmingly against the war. I guess McCain hasn't been paying attention.

The Brits are bailing out, pulling thousands of troops out of the south of Iraq, amid reports in the British press that all U.K. forces will be gone by the end of 2008. It's a body blow to the Coalition of the Willing.

But Dick Cheney, never one to be tethered to pesky reality, says:

"Well, I look at it and see it is actually an affirmation that there are parts of Iraq where things are going pretty well," Cheney told ABC News' Jonathan Karl.

"In fact, I talked to a friend just the other day who had driven to Baghdad down to Basra, seven hours, found the situation dramatically improved from a year or so ago, sort of validated the British view they had made progress in southern Iraq and that they can therefore reduce their force levels," Cheney said.

Tony Cordesman of CSIS, ever the realist, makes the point that what the Brits are doing is simply handing the south over to the Shiite militias, and that Britain long ago "lost" the south:

There is no doubt that any British troop reduction that is not coordinated with a US reduction weakens the image of the Coalition and further isolates the US. This is a war of perceptions, as well as military power, and the influence of British cuts will be negative.

At the same time, the British military position in the south is radically different from that of the US. The British long ago essentially ceded the two provinces they control -- Basra and Maisan -- to Shi'ite Islamist factions. They lost Basra in 2005 to rival Shi'ite extremist parties and essentially let most of the city become a no go zone unless they conducted active operations. They pulled out of much of the southeast to the north of Basra in 2006.

The British soft approach has worked little better, if at all, than the American hard approach. The British were not defeated in a military sense, but lost in the political sense if "victory" means securing the southeast for the central government and some form of national unity. Soft ethnic cleansing has been going on in Basra for more than two years, and the south has been the scene of the less violent form of civil war for control of political and economic space that is as important as the more openly violent struggles in Anbar and Basra.

As a result, the British cuts will in many ways simply reflect the political reality that the British "lost" the south more than a year ago. The Shi'ites will takeover, Iranian influence will probably expand, and more Sunnis, Christians, and other minorities will leave. British action will mean more pressure for federation and separatism, but local power struggles are more likely to be between Shi'ite factions than anything else.

The British withdrawal from the south of Iraq isn’t getting nearly the play it deserves here, possibly because of the absurd White House spin that the U.K.’s pullout is a sign of things getting better in Iraq.

The latest news from Britain is that the British army itself wanted to get out of Iraq a lot faster than Tony Blair has the stomach for:

British military chiefs had been pushing for much bigger cuts in troop numbers in Iraq than those announced by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair.

For months, army commanders have suggested that British forces' presence on the streets of Basra was doing more harm than good, that it was time to lower expectations and let Iraqi forces take charge of security.

They were forced to agree to a more gradual reduction, partly in deference to US sensitivities.

Meanwhile, Tony Cordesman of CSIS has a blunt assessment, that the British were simply defeated in the south, by SCIRI and the Mahdi Army. Here’s the link to Cordesman analysis, which says:

The British may not have been defeated in a purely military sense, but lost long ago in the political sense if "victory" means securing the southeast for some form of national unity. Soft ethnic cleansing has been going on in Basra for more than two years, and the south has been the scene of the less violent form of civil war for control of political and economic space that is as important as the more openly violent struggles in Anbar and Basra.

As a result, the coming British cuts in many ways reflect the political reality that the British "lost" the south more than a year ago. The Shi'ites will takeover, Iranian influence will probably expand, and more Sunnis, Christians, and other minorities will leave.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a pro-Israeli thinktank, has a far more detailed account of the history of Britain’s defeat here.

Okay, they're chimps. But the Post reports today that chimps are making weapons:

Chimpanzees living in the West African savannah have been observed fashioning deadly spears from sticks and using the tools to hunt small mammals -- the first routine production of deadly weapons ever observed in animals other than humans.

No doubt the Pentagon is down there, too, offering them a defense contract. Ain't globalization grand?

In today's WSJ, Yochi Dreazen has piece about the latest return of Ahmed Chalabi, this time a special adviser to the Baghdad surge. In fact, Chalabi never really went away. But his new job puts him back at the center of things.

Those seeking background on Chalabi, and his long ties to the neocons, ought to take a look at my 2002 profile of the man for The American Prospect, the first significant piece on him in the U.S. media.

Here's the lede from Dreazen's piece:

In his latest remarkable political reincarnation, onetime U.S. favorite Ahmed Chalabi has secured a position inside the Iraqi government that could help determine whether the Bush administration's new push to secure Baghdad succeeds.

In a new post created earlier this year, Mr. Chalabi will serve as an intermediary between Baghdad residents and the Iraqi and U.S. security forces mounting an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign across the city. The position is meant to help Iraqis arrange reimbursement for damage to their cars and homes caused by the security sweeps in the hope of maintaining public support for the strategy.

Mr. Chalabi's writ is supposed to be limited mainly to security, according to aides to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, but he is already speaking ambitiously about playing a larger role in economic, health and reconstruction efforts as well. In his new capacity, Mr. Chalabi answers directly to Mr. Maliki and is already taking part in weekly planning meetings with senior American officials such as Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. military commander in Iraq.

Mr. Chalabi's position was created as part of a broad push by Mr. Maliki's government to capitalize on any positive momentum created by the addition of 21,500 additional American forces to Iraq, of which some 3,000 have arrived so far. In the weeks after President Bush disclosed his plans to "surge" additional forces to Iraq, Mr. Maliki created five new government committees charged with making the plan work on the ground. They include panels focused on economic development, the restoration of basic services such as electricity, and, in Mr. Chalabi's case, the critical task of maintaining public backing for the initiative.

The new position is vaguely defined, and it is too early to tell how much power Mr. Chalabi will ultimately wield. How much money will be available to pay claims and how it might be awarded and disbursed remains to be finalized, too. But he is a skilled political infighter who has often shown a talent for making the most out of whatever hand he is dealt. Mr. Chalabi also maintains close ties with key political allies of Mr. Maliki such as radical Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, which gives him extra sway within Mr. Maliki's government. Indeed, U.S. Embassy officials suggest Mr. Chalabi's closeness to Mr. Sadr is a major reason he was offered the liaison post.

Already, some U.S. officials are expressing concern about Mr. Chalabi's new role, fearing he will undercut the elaborate system of elected and appointed local governments that American officials have been cultivating over the past three years. American and Iraqi critics also worry that Mr. Chalabi, a Shiite, will use his clout to ensure that Sunni Muslim neighborhoods of the city are hit hardest by the new security crackdown, a move that would further inflame Iraq's sectarian tensions.

It's something that's been rumored for a while, including to me, and I've used it as an argument that President Bush can't get away with attacking Iran. Despite all, despite Sy Hersh's latest piece, I don't believe that either Condi Rice or Bob Gates will let the White House go to war against Iran. Now comes the London Sunday Times with an authoritative piece, based on British intelligence sources, saying that a host of U.S. generals and admirals will quit if Bush attacks Iran:

Some of America’s most senior military commanders are prepared to resign if the White House orders a military strike against Iran, according to highly placed defence and intelligence sources.

Tension in the Gulf region has raised fears that an attack on Iran is becoming increasingly likely before President George Bush leaves office. The Sunday Times has learnt that up to five generals and admirals are willing to resign rather than approve what they consider would be a reckless attack.

“There are four or five generals and admirals we know of who would resign if Bush ordered an attack on Iran,” a source with close ties to British intelligence said. “There is simply no stomach for it in the Pentagon, and a lot of people question whether such an attack would be effective or even possible.”

A British defence source confirmed that there were deep misgivings inside the Pentagon about a military strike. “All the generals are perfectly clear that they don’t have the military capacity to take Iran on in any meaningful fashion. Nobody wants to do it and it would be a matter of conscience for them.

Latest poll results show that Americans are yawning about the supposed threat from Iran. After a year of nonstop war-mongering from the White House, the percentage of Americans who see Iran as "America's greatest enemy" fell from 31 per cent in February, 2006, to 26 per cent today.

Interestingly, 21 per cent said that America's "greatest enemy" is ... Iraq. Huh?