It might be too late, now that Iraq sectarian killings have surpassed the daily toll of the war between the United States and the resistance in Iraq. What they United States ought to have done two years ago -- namely, make a deal with the resistance and its core Baathist leadership -- might, after all, be happening. It's unclear how far up the food chain in the Bush administration this effort goes, but it appears that a desperate Ambassador Khalilzad has realized the importance of forging ties to the Baath party. Here's Time magazine's Michael Ware on the topic:

The ongoing dialogue between the U.S. and the Sunni insurgency is based on a shared wariness about the influence of Iran and its supporters in Iraq. U.S. officials are now saying bluntly that it's time to bring back the Baath Party, excluding only those that are guilty of specific crimes. That reflects a growing acceptance among U.S. officials that the military and bureaucratic know-how in the Sunni community is badly needed, even to help run the security forces that the U.S. is standing up.

Senior Baathist insurgent commanders are responding positively to the U.S. outreach on the political and military level. One senior commander I spoke to praised the U.S. for the release of some key Baathist officers who had been imprisoned, and later, when I asked a senior U.S. intelligence officer about the releases, he said the men had been freed as part of a calculated effort to demonstrate good faith in dealing with the insurgents. Of course, both sides share the objective of avoiding a civil war.

One senior Baathist talking about the Americans said to me, recently, "In the 1980s we were allies, how did we end up on opposite sides?" The Baathists are secular nationalists, they never allied with al-Qaeda or hardline Islamists when they were in power, and they've always been the sworn enemy of the soon-to-be-nuclear-armed regime in Iran. They share two of America's main enemies, al-Qaeda and Iran. The Baathists and al-Qaeda elements who have worked together in the insurgency have always been uncomfortable bedfellows. And they've left little doubt in each other's minds that once the Americans leave, they'll have to fight each other.

That's all good, but it is likely too late. My guess is, the Baathists will have to fight this war (against Iran, against Al Qaeda, to rein in the Kurds, etc.) on their own, once we leave. It is going to be bloody.